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I Introduction
551
Stlmming up the lessons of the final book of his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Locke describes two 'ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far
as we are capable.'l One involves the cultivation of our capacity for
demonstrative reasoning, the other the proper framing of the ideas from
which any such reasoning must issue and on which mere 'experimental
Knowledge' (IV.iii.29: 560) is likewise founded. Under the latter heading,
we are urged to aim not only for 'clear' and 'distinct' ideas, but also for
'perfect' ones. Finally, a laconic insertion in the fourth edition specifies
how the perfection of one class of ideas is to be pursued:
And if they be speeifie Ideas of Substanees, we should endeavor also to make them
as complete as we can, whereby Imean, that we should put together as many simple
Ideas, as being constantly observed to co-exist, may perfectly determine the Spe-
eies.... (IV.xii.14: 648)
1 John Locke, An Essay Coneerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1975), book IV, chapter xii, §14: 648; also IV.xii.6-7: 642-3. The
expression inmy title appears in the marginal summary of IH.vi.19-20: 449. All italics
in citations from the Essay are Locke's; boldface indicates my emphasis.
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I believe that a failure to appreciate the line of thought encapsulated in
this sentence has stood in the way of an adequate understanding of
Locke's views regarding the respective roles of nature and the under-
standing in constituting substantial sorts, as expressed in his doctrine of
their 'real' and 'nominal essences.' In this paper, I venture an explication
of Locke's often overlooked norm of perfection in the light of which this
perennial area of his philosophy assumes a more sophisticated look than
even his most well-meaning critics have discerned in it.
The nature of the resulting reading should emerge from the following
sketch of the course of argument I propose to offer in its defense. In
Section 11, I begin by examining Locke's claims about the 'properties' of
substantial sorts. We can only understand his clain1s, I argue here, if we
recognize that the sorts characterized by these properties are neither
exhaustively determined by our abstract ideas nor constituted by nature
independently of the human understanding. Section 111 then canvasses
the various purposes served by Locke's injunction to perfect the sub-
stance-ideas used in scientific discourse, concluding that all are subor-
dinate to the pursuit of collections of perceptible qualities that
correspond to some shared structure at the microscopic level. This
suggests a recognizable form for the required compromise between
classificatory conventionalism and essentialism: the natural sorting of
substances depends constitutively on the interests reflected in a particu-
lar norm of scientific inquiry. Finally, Section IV draws on the resulting
picture of natural kinds to illuminate Locke's seemingly noncommittal
remarks about whether there are 'prefixed bounds' in nature, and ad-
dresses its consequences for his account of language.
The central role in motivating my reading will be played by an
exegetical dilemma seemingly posed by a conflict between two of
Locke's central themes: his exhortation that we perfect our ideas of
substantial sorts so as to make thembetter approximate 'standardsmade
by nature,' and his dismissal on metaphysical grounds of any claim that
nature distinguishes substances into species. Most recent commentators
have stressed the second theme while either ignoring the first or failing
to recognize the standards in question as naturally privileged kinds. A
minority tradition has pointed to the first theme while either ignoring
the second or reinterpreting it as a merely epistemological thesis. What
has gone unappreciated is the availability of a reading that respects
Locke's grounds for rejecting 'specific differences in nature,' while inter-
preting the rejection in such a way as to leave it compatiblewith the claim
that Ollr sorting of substances answers to naturally privileged kinds.
This possibility is easily obscured by a misconception of the relevance
of Locke's semantic theory. It can be tempting to assume that his account
of the names of species reflects his embrace of a radically conventionalist
view of substantial sorts. All the sorting expressible in language, he
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famously insists, is the 'Workmanship ofthe Understanding' (III.iii.13: 415).
Shouldn't this doctrine debar hirn from professing reference to inde-
pendently constituted kinds that serve as standards against which to
measure the understanding's ideas? Whatever the answer, we will see
that far from relying on this point, Locke even disputes it. It should
already give pause that early drafts of the Essay combine the same
semantic theory with an unperturbed readiness to speak of a species as
it is distinguished 'by nature.' More importantly, Locke comes to be
painfully aware of the threat posed by the above question. When he
addresses it, he does so not by renouncing reference to naturally privi-
leged kinds but rather by attempting to circumvent the prima facie
expressive limits of his semantic theory. And while the most explicit of
these attempts run afoul of his own anti-essentialist insights, I will
propose that an implicit one reveals the outlines of a suggestive Lockean
theory of natural kinds and their names.
111mperfeet Colleetions of Properties
1. Beholdenness to reality
Any interpretation of Locke on the 'names of substances' must accom-
modate one basic fact. Locke holds that each substance-predicate's ex-
tension is fully determined by the abstract idea to which that predicate
has been 'annexed' (and which it thereby 'signifies'), an idea known as
the respective sort's 'nomiI1.al essence.' Though I have recast it in current
semantic terminology, this is the thesis he plainly intends when he
identifies 'conformity to the Idea, to which the name is annexed' as 'that
which gives a right to thatname' (III.iii.12: 414). Illustrating one direction
of the implied biconditional, he adds that 'nothing can be aMan, or have
a right to the name Man, but what has a conformity to the abstract Idea
the nameMan stands for.' A later passage stresses the converse: it is 'the
complex Idea, to which that name is annexed, that makes the Species: and
as any particular parcel of Matter answers that Idea, so the name of tl1.e
sort belongs truly to it' (III.vi.35: 462)? What the 'conformity' of thing to
2 Cf. Joseph LaPorte, 'Locke's Semantics and the New Theory of Reference to Natural
Kinds,' Locke Newsletter 27 (1996) 41-64, at 44-6. Note Locke's semantic vocabulary:
words 'belong truly' to things, which in turn 'have the right to' names. By contrast,
it has long been recognized that neither 'signifying' nor 'standing for' is a reference
relation (e.g. Norman Kretzmann, 'The Main Thesis of Locke's Semantic Theory,'
Philosophical Review 77 (1968) 175-96); the same holds for the relation between aword
and its 'meaning,' defined as the 'Idea it stands for' (IILiii.10: 413). We will soon see
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substance-idea involves is scarcely more open to debate: a thing con-
forms to the complex idea signified by a substance-name just in case it
possesses each of the observable qualities collected in that idea.3 (For ease
of exposition, I will regularly join Locke in speaking as if these qualities
themselves, rather than 'simple ideas' thereof, were contained in a
complex idea.4)
Nonetheless, there are externalistic pressures in the Essay that can call
into question the stability of Locke's commitment to this semantic frame-
work.5 To appreciate this, we need only consider the difference Locke
most often points to between ideas of substantial sorts, such as the ideas
of a man and of lead, and ideas of modal sorts, such as the ideas of a
triangle and of beauty. By contrast with ideas of modes, substance-ideas
are 'made all of them in reference to Things existing without us, and
intended to be Representations ofSubstances, as they really are' (II.xxx.5:
that a substance-name is properly 'referred to' neither the idea it 'signifies' nor the
dass of those things to which it 'belongs truly.' Finally, a principal task for this paper
will be to explain the relation between a Lockean natural kind and the name that is
'used for' it, the name by which it is 'called.'
3 For a lone dissent, see Martha Brandt Bolton, 'Substances, Substrata, and Names of
Substances in Locke's Essay,' Philosophical Review 85 (1976) 488-513. On Bolton's
reading, the 'confused Idea of Substance' included as a component in each idea of a
substantial sort (II.xii.6: 165, II.xxiii.3: 297, III.vi.21: 450) plays the role of an actuality
operator. As an example, assurne that the qualities rational and animal exhaust the
constituent qualities in the abstract idea of man. Bolton denies that being a rational
animal need be a sufficient condition for conforming to this idea. Instead, roughly,
something in any possible world will conform to the idea provided it possesses all
properties flowing from the explanatory 'internal constitution' shared by all actual
rational animals (worries about ill-definedness are addressed, in my view superfi-
cially, at 507-8n45). It should soon become apparent that I share much of the
motivation behind this reading. However, I will argue that we can embrace a strong
version of Bolton's key insight (cf. 506-8) that the kind represented by a substance-
idea is to some degree independent of the idea'sdescriptive contentwithout insisting,
in the absence of specific evidence, that Locke treats conformity to a nominal essence
as modally rigid.
4 This habit, together with Locke's acknowledged use of 'idea' where we would
expect 'quality' (II.viii.8: 134), may reflect more than an innocent arrLbiguity: see
Jonathan Bennett, 'Ideas and Qualities in Locke's Essay,' History of Philosophy
Quarterly 13 (1996) 73-88.
5 They were acutely perceived by Leibniz in his comment on III.xi.24 (New Essays on
Human Understanding [1703-5], trans. P. Remnant and J. Bennett (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1981),354). Discussing the same passage in Locke, Michael
Ayers warns not to 'import into his arguments contradictions and tensions that do
not exist there' (Locke: Epistemology and Ontology (London: Routledge 1991), vol. 2,
76). I hope to vindicate Leibniz.
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374; see also II.xxxii.18: 390, II.xxx1.14: 384). Later passages characterize
such representational intent as a supposition of conformability: sub-
stance-ideas 'carry with them the Supposition of some real Being, from
which they are taken, and to which they are conformable' (III.v.3: 429);
they are 'supposed conformable to the reality of Things, and are referred
to Standards made by Nature' (III.ix.11: 481). What does this supposition
of initial and ongoing conformability of idea to reality consist in?6 Rather
than a belief about a substance-idea's empirical origin or the existence
of something answering to it, the 'supposition' in question proves to be
the normative stance of holding the idea answerable to an extra-mental
standard or 'archetype.' (Introduced in II.xxx-xxxii, Locke's vocabulary
of 'archetypes' and the 'ectypes' that are 'referred' to them serves to
express a direction of fit.) Most importan.tly, the proper archetype in
natllre to which to hold a substance-idea accountable is not a particular
substantial thing, but rather the set of perceptible qualities characteristic
of the respective sort of substance. The normative stance just described
finds its expression in Locke's thesis that the nominal essence of a sort
of substance can and indeed always will inadequately represent the
perceptible 'properties' possessed by that sort, those perceptible quali-
ties that result from the microscopic 'internal constitution' that is its 'real
essence'?
6 I follow Bolton in posing this question as achallenge to conventionalist readings
('Substances, Substrata, and Names,' 495-9).
7 Here I endorse the customary view that Locke employs a notion of the 'internal
constitution' or 'real essence' of a sort of substance, understood as an aspect of the
interna1constitution of each individual of the sort. While this assumption should
garner support throughout my paper, David Owen's thesis that real essences and
interna1constitutions are possessed only by particulars merits response ('Locke on
Real Essence,'History ofPhilosophy Quarterly 8 (1991) 105-18).Where Locke identifies
a sense of 'real essence' that 'relates to a Sort, and supposes a Species' (III.vi.6: 442),
Owen construes hirn as referring to the internal constitution of a particular, consid-
ered as the source of those qualities rendered essential by subsumption of this
particular under a sort determined by a nominal essence (113-14). Other passages
are resilient to Owen's strategy, though. Consider the parallelism of 'the nominal
Essence ofGold' and 'the real Essence' (IILvi.2: 439), or Locke's claim that knowledge
of the 'Properties ofGold' and other substances could be obtained ifwe had 'specifick
Ideas of their real Essences in our own Minds' (IV.vi.11: 585; cf. IV.xii.9: 645). For
'interna!' or 'real constitutions' of substantial sorts, see ILxxxi.10: 382, IILvi.3: 440,
and IV.vi.15: 590. Locke is plainest in reply to Stillingfleet: while the particular
'internal constitutions' of finite things are alterable, the abstract 'internal constitu-
tion or real essence of a species' is 'unchangeable' (First Letter [1696-7], in Works
(London, 1823), vol. 4: 90-1). Still, he makes do wherever possible with a notion of
real essence less liable to suggest a substantial form: the interna1constitution of a
particular. Indeed, I believe the entirety of chapter III.iii on 'General Terms' should
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The first mention of this theme occurs early in Locke's discussion of
our ideas of substantial sorts: 'For he has the perfectest Idea of any of the
particular sorts of Substance, who has gathered, and put together, most
of those simple Ideas, which do exist in it' (lI.xxiii.7: 299). Yet 'it is
comn1.only hard to know all the simple Ideas, which are really in any
Substance,' whence our ideas of substances remain 'imperfeet' (II.xxv.8:
322). As such, they deserve to be considered 'inadequate ideas': ideas
that are 'but a partial, or incomplete representation of those Archetypes
to which they are referred' (II.xxxi.1: 375) and thus 'are not what the
Mind intends them to be' (II.xxxi.13: 383). Locke devotes a large part of
his chapter on 'Adequate and Inadequate Ideas' to establishing that 'it is
impossible we should have adequate Ideas of any Substance, made up of
a Collection of all its Properties' (II.xxxi.8: 381). After listing the various
qualities that 'put together, usually n1.ake the complex Idea in Men's
Minds, of that sort of Body we call Gold,' he adds:
But no one, who hath considered the Properties of Bodies in general, or of this sort
in particular, can doubt, that this, call'd Gold, has infinite other Properties, not
contained in that complex Idea. Some, who have examined this Species more
accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in Gold, all of
them as inseparable from its internal Constitution, as its Colour, or Weight: And
,tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties, that are by divers Men known of
this Metal, there would be an hundred times as many Ideas, go to the complex Idea
of Gold, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet, perhaps, that not be the thousandth
part of what is to be discovered in it. (II.xxxi.10: 382; see also II.xxxii.24: 393)
Parallel considerations show that 'all aur complex Ideas of Substances are
imperfect and inadequate' (II.xxxi.11: 382). As we will see, this line of
thought recurs prominently throughout Book 111.
Locke's contention that our substance-ideas only inadequately repre-
sent th.e respective sorts of substances poses a primafacie challenge to the
nominal-essence semantics described above. If the perceptible proper-
ties of gold outstrip the qualities collected in its nominal essence, might
there not exist a piece of metal displaying each of the latter while lacking
one or more of the former? Since the properties of a sort are its 'insepa-
be understood in this manner, as Owen reveals it can be. Owen's scrupulously
nominalist reading of this chapter is certainly supported by its entirely different
alignment of the perishable/permanent distinction with that between real and
nominal essences (III.iii.19: 419).
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rable' qualities, such an object would apparently fail to be gold despite
conforming to its nominal essence.8
2. The semantically innocuous reading
There remains a construal of the imperfection claim according to which
it poses no threat to Locke's semantic theory. (Remarkably, I know of
only one commentator who has explicitly acknowledged his commit-
ment to this reading/ though it will be seen to follow from the customary
understanding of substantial sorts' real essences). On this 'semantically
innocuous' reading, it is a conceptual truth that all properties of a sort of
substance necessarily accompany the conjunction of qualities in its nominal
essence. Of course, we are rarely in a position to recognize this necessity
(since, among other shortcomings, we lack ideas of the corpuscular
textures underlying secondary qualities). At best, on this reading, re-
peated experience enables us to guess that malleableness is necessarily
atten.dant on possession of 'a certain Colour, Weight, and Hardness'
(lI.xxxi.6: 379). Whether we are right when we do in fact 'look on' this
quality as a property of the sort ofmetal thus defined canneverbe known
(advocates of this reading will have to discount Locke's ready appeal to
'the Properties we discover in that Body,' as well as his above-cited
aSSLlrances regarding the myriads of properties an accurate examination
can make known). Locke actually says in this passage th.at the putative
property malleableness 'has no l1.eCessary connexion' with the sort's
nominal essence, but this poses no genuine difficulty for the semantically
innocuous reading: the epistemic modesty urged in Book IV suggests
that he really means 'no necessary connexion, that we can discover'
(IV.vi.8: 583). In fact, remarks from that book might even appear to
motivate the view tl1.at any additional properties would have to be
necessary concon1.itants of the collection already in the nominal essence.
I may expand my nominal essence to make it 'consist of more simple
Ideas than before,' Locke writes,
yet still, it not containing the real Essence of any Species of Bodies, it helps me not
certainly to know (I say to know, perhaps, it may to conjecture) the other remaining
Properties of that Body, farther than they have a visible connexion, with some or all
of the simple Ideas, that make up my nominal Essence. (IV.xii.9: 645)
8 Bolton's explication ofLocke's semantics (summarized innote 3) does allow an object
in a possible but non-actual world to 'conform to our description of gold, but lack
some of the properties typical of gold, and so fail to be gold' ('Substances, Substrata,
and Names,' 507-8).
9 Owen, 'Locke on Real Essence,' 111
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Strictly speaking, this is inconclusive: connection with the nominal
essence is being adduced as a sufficient, not as a necessary condition of
propertyhood. Still, advocates of the innocuous reading may ask, is it
not plausible that Locke means to convey the full equivalence?lo
I will argue below that the semantically innocuous account of prop-
ertyhood leaves Locke's own concerns about expressibility unintelligible
(Section 11.3), results in commitment to an unlikely hypothesis about the
genesis of the views he advances in the Essay (Section 11.5), and deprives
of all motivation his advocacy of pursuing 'natural history' in order to
'perfect' our ideas of substances (Section 111). First, however, let me point
to a grammatical feature of Locke's analysis whose compatibility with
nominal-essence semantics will in any event require explanation. Recall
that Locke doesn't introduce the notion of an imperfect idea simpliciter;
it is an imperfect idea ofasort ofsubstance,whichby the addition of flIrther
qualities may be rendered a more perfect idea of the same sort of
substance. Owing to the inclusion of different sets of simple ideas in the
'complex Idea of that Substance, wherein they all are join'd,' the result in
turn of 'various Examination, SkilI, or Observation of that subject,'
different people will 'have different Essences ofGold' (11I.vi.31: 458-9). That
Locke doesn't merely mean different ideas signifted by the same name is
even more evident from a subsequent formulation:
[M]en, though they propose to themselves the very same Subject to consider, yet
frame very different Ideas about it; and so the Name they use for it, unavoidably
comes to have, in several Men, very different significations. (III.ix.13: 482)
10 A second passage in Book IV might appear to support the innocuous reading by
implying that whatever secondary qualities 'result from' the 'Constitution of the
insensible parts' of a substance 'consequently must always co-exist with that com-
plex Idea we have of it' (IV.iii.11: 545). Though the point can't be fuHy argued here,
I believe this conclusion would be unwarranted. In section IV.vi.7, Locke retrospec-
tively summarizes two 'Reasons mentioned, Chap. 3,' clearly corresponding to the
theses of sections IV.iii.11 and 12. The wording of this summary strongly suggests
that when Locke refers in N.iii.11 to additional qualities resulting from the 'same
Constitution of the insensible parts of Gold' on which the qualities in our nominal
essence depend, he does not have inmind qualities resulting from gold's real essence.
Rather, he is referring to those secondary qualities (should there be any) necessarily
possessed by anything that shares each of the various real constitutions underlying
the qualities in the nominal essence. The 'reason' knowledge of the necessary
coexistence of qualities was found to be unattainable is not that we lack knowledge
of real essences, but that 'we know not the real Constitutions of Substances, on
which each secondary Quality particularly depends' (IV.vi.7: 582).
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The same name may be used for the same sort of substance with two
different significations.ll Thus the possibility arises that complex ideas
of substances possess a kind of 'ofness' not exhausted by the conformity
of objects to their component simple ideas, and that nanles carry a
'fomess' distinct from that determined by the nominal essences they
'signify.'
Admittedly, we do find a passage that can give the impression of
retrospectively repudiating Locke's own talk of 'different Ideas of the
same Substance' (IILix.13: 483). Whereas the existence of various (more
or less imperfect) ideas of gold figures in chapter IILix as an inevitable
'imperfection' in our use of words, the subsequent chapter might seem
to qualify the very admission of its possibility as an outright 'abuse' of
words. '[I]n that [substance] called Gold,' Locke teIls us,
one [man] puts into his complex Idea, what another leaves out; and Vice Versa: yet
Men do not usually think, that therefore the Species is changed.... He that adds to his
complex Idea ofGold, that of Fixedness or Solubility in Aqua Regia, which he put not
in it before, is not thought to have changed the Species; but only to have a more
perfeet Idea .... (III.x.19: 501)
According to his diagnosis, people are led to think like this '[b]ecause
they secretly in their Minds referr that name, and suppose it annexed to
areal immutable Essence of a thing existing, on which those Properties
depend.' And this 'secret Supposition' (IILx.18: 500) counts as one of the
chief abuses of words:
But this reference of the name to a thing, whereofwe have not the Idea, is so far from
helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us inDifficulties. Forby this tacit
reference to the real Essence of that Species of Bodies, the Word Gold (...) comes to
have no signification at all, being put for somewhat, whereofwe have no Idea at all....
(III.x.19: 501; cf. II.xxxi.8: 380 and II.xxxii.18: 390)
Yet Locke can't be intending to repudiate his own sanction of various
ideas of th.e same substance. The passage cited from IILix was expressly
placed outside the scope of the incriminated supposition that the signifi-
cations of our substance-names 'agree to' the 'Real Constitution ofThings'
(IILix.12: 482). It directly follows a claim that it is th.e 'simple Ideas that
11 Context establishes the 'same subject' as a sort, rather than a particular. A directly
prior mention of 'these simple Ideas that ... are united in the same Subject' refers back
to 'these [simple ideas], as united in the several Sorts ofThings.' Two sentence later,
Locke supports his conclusion that people have 'different Ideas of the same Sub-
stance' by observing that 'the Properties of any sort of Bodies [are] not easy to be
collected.' It is only in the next section that he raises the additional point that 'any
particular thing existing' can be classified into various sorts.
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are found to co-exist in Substances, ... as united in the several Sorts of
Things' that 'are the proper Standards to which their Names are referred,
al1d by which their Significations may best be rectified' (1II.ix.13: 482).
Locke's point is that not even those who reject the useless supposition
and properly set about adjusting their substance-ideas according to
'these Archetypes' are assured flawless communication: different indi-
viduals will end up with different ideas of the same sorts of substance.
Indeed, the remark in parentheses I elided from the passage in III.x
merely adds to this the reassurance that the word 'gold', 'by standing for
a more or less perfect Collection of simple Ideas, serves to design that sort
of Body weIl enough in civil Discourse.' The abuse Locke is objecting to,
rather, is a particular understanding of what it is for two ideas associated
with the name 'gold' to be ll10re or less perfect ideas of the same sort of
substance, namely the widespread secret supposition that what counts
as gold is determined otherwise than by agreement with the nOll1inal
essel1ce. In effect, Locke warns us not to interpret his talk of more or less
perfect ideas of 'that sort ofbody' as an abandonment ofnominal-essence
semanties.
The semantically innocuous reading owed its designation to the ease
with which it sustained nominal-essence sell1antics while at the same
time offering an account of what makes an idea of gold imperfect. As we
have now seen, there remains the additional task of explaining what
makes the idea an idea ofgold. Here not even the innocuous reading can
avoid bringing to bear an extrinsic exegetical apparatus. Let me call one
collection of sensible qualities equivalent to another provided every
quality contained in the first enjoys a necessary connection with the
conjunction of those contained in the second, and vice versa. Now I
might try to uphold the innocuous reading by stipulating (for example)
that one of Aristotle's ideas was an idea ofgold provided it is equivalent
to the idea I signify by 'gold', and tl1at Aristotle used the name 'Xpucr6<;'
for gold provided the idea he signified by that name was an idea of gold.
Bllt there is compelling reason to doubt whether the semantically in-
nocuous reconciliation of the imperfection thesis with nominal-essence
semantics can be the right one. Surprisingly, the main problem is neither
the need for the exegetical stretch just demonstrated nor the consequence
that one can always only 'conjecture' whether another's distinct idea is
one of gold, but rather the fact that the reconciliation is altogether too
comfortable!
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3. Concerns about expressibility
The evidence in question derives from places where we find Locke
self-consciously struggling to express the imperfection thesis in a nlan-
ner that doesn't conflict with his semantic framework. Consider the
following attempt at explaining his already familiar claim that we are
unable to distinguish substances into species according to 'perfect com-
plex Ideas of the Properties of things, flowing from their different real
Essences':
for being ignorant of the real Essence it self, it is impossible to know all those
Properties, that flow from it, and are so annexed to it, that any one of them being
away, we may certainly conc1ude, that that Essence is not there, and so the Thing is
not of that Species. We can never know what are the precise number of Properties
depending on the real Essence of Gold, any one of which failing, the real Essence of
Gold, and consequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real Essence
of Gold it self, and by that determined that Species.
Sensing some kind of trouble, Locke adds a gloss:
By the word Gold here, 1must be understood to design a particular piece of Matter;
v.g. the last Guinea that was coin'd. For if it should stand here in its ordinary
Signification for that complex Idea, which I, or any one else calls Gold; i.e. for the
nominal Essence of Gold, it would be Jargon: so hard it is, to shew the various
meaning and imperfection ofWords, when we have nothing else butWords to do
it by. (III.vi.19: 449)
Why would using the word 'gold' in its ordinary signification result in
'jargon'? Locke uses this term for the unintelligible and the nonsensical,
such as a claim that there is uncol1.scious thought (II.i.19: 115, II.xxxiii.18:
401). The absurdity he must have in mind ensues when he envisions the
very possibility I have cited as a threat to nominal-essence semantics: the
possibility that a thing might conform to the imperfect nominal essence
signified by 'gold', yet fail to possess one of the unknown further
'Properties depending on the real Essence of Gold,' thus (he seems
compelled to conclude) failing to be gold.12 Such absurdity can be
12 1 am indebted here to John Troyer, 'Locke on the Names of Substances,' Locke
Newsletter6 (1975) 27-39. Locke's qualificationmayhave beenmotivated bythe even
clearer threat of 'jargon' in aprecursor to the present passage. InDraft Bof 1671, as
in the Essay, he insists that a person's words 'can signifie noe more then ... is in his
owne thoughts,' whence substance-names stand for our 'imperfect Ideas' and not
those collections of simple ideas that 'perfectly destinguish' things of a species. He
continues: 'Considering things as rankd into sorts by nature let us examin thatwhich
we may be supposed to know best of all & call man & we shall finde that ... it is far
yet from being certainly determined what those qualitys or simple Ideas are ..., of
which simple Ideas when any one or more is wanting, the thing wherein that want
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avoided, Locke here suggests, if we 'shew the ... imperfection' of the
nominal essence signified by the word 'gold' by contrasting it instead
with the full set of properties flowing from the real essence of (the sort
of substance con1posing) the last-coined guinea. For there is no contradic-
tion in an object's having a right to the name'gold' while failing to belong
h . 13to t at specles.
This passage is only one of Locke's sometimes tortuous attempts to
talk of a discrepancy between the nominal essence of some particular
sort of substance and the properties that are really in that sort, flowing
from its real essence. As we saw earlier, he initially resorts to semantic
ascent, trading in use of the word 'gold' for mere mention. Referring to
our ordinary idea 'of that sort of Body we call Gold,' he pronounces it
indubitable 'that this, call'd Gold, has infinite other Properties, not con-
tained in that complex Idea' (II.xxxi.9-10: 382, also 381). Later in the Essay,
perhaps sel1sing the apparent futility of such a maneuver,14 he seeks to
identify the sort by specifying an individual either through adefinite
description or demonstratively. In view of the appeal we have already
is, is not of that kinde or ranke of creaturs, nor to be called man' (in John Locke,
Drafts for the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical
Writings, vol. I, P.H. Nidditch and G.A.J. Rogers, eds. [Oxford: Clarendon Press
1990], §77-8: 184-5; see also Draft A, §2: 9-10). Locke seems unaware of the possible
conflict (regarding the determination ofwhich things are 'to be calledman') between
conformity to the nominal essence and membership in a species constituted 'by
nature,' i.e. 'otherwise then in respect of the common name we have given it' (ibid.).
Though I will argue that he develops a subtler theory of substantial kinds in the
Essay, the potential for such 'jargon' persists.
13 The passage under discussion occurs as part of an enumeration of conditions whose
obtaining would be 'necessary' for us to be able to 'distinguish substantial Beings
into Species, according to the usual supposition, that there are certain precise Essences
or Forms of Things, whereby all the Individuals existing, are, by Nature, distin-
guished into Species' (III.vi.14: 448). Hence advocates of the innocuous reading
might dismiss Locke's complaint about how 'hard it is' to express the imperfection
of nominal essences as merely drawing a consequence of that mistaken 'usual
supposition' (cf. LaPorte, 'Locke's Semantics,' 50-5). However, it would be far-
fetched not to regard the complaint as pronounced in propria voce. After all, it isn't
the expressive predicament that Locke cites as a difficulty for his opponent. Rather, it
is the thesis he is trying to express ('Our nominal Essences of Substances, not perfect
Collections of Properties'), one whose obtaining is not predicated on his opponent's
mistaken supposition.
14 The maneuver is futile as long as the semantic ascent appealed to is the familiar
variety entailing the identity of gold with the substance called 'gold'. If I am right,
though, Locke is best viewed as implicitly trying to employ the phrase 'the substance
called "gold'" in a sense that won't license this 'disquotational' identity. In Section
IV.2, I sketch an account of what that sense could be.
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seen Locke make to the last-coined guinea, the following passage sug-
gests the same approach:
[N]o one can shew a Reason, why ... the Word Gold, signifying that sort of Body the
Ring on his Finger is made of, should determine that sort, rather by its Colour,
Weight, and Fusibility; than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in Aqua Regia:
Since the dissolving it by that Liquor, is as inseparable from it, as the Fusion by
Fire.... [l\T]o one has Authority to determine the signification of the Word Gold, (as
referr'd to such a Body existing in Nature) more to one Collection of Ideas to be
found in that Body, than to another: Whereby the signification of that name must
unavoidably be very uncertain. Since, as has been said, several People observe
several Properties in the same Substance; and, I think, I may say no body all.
(IILix.17: 486)
In order for a quality to be acceptable for inclusion in a nominal essence
that will'determine' the sort in question, Locke here assumes, it must be
'inseparable from' that sort. This shows th.at the determination of sort by
nominal essence can't be constitutive; Locke instead invokes a sort against
which the candidate nominal essence is to be measured.15 There remains
a question whether he takes this target sort - 'such a Body existing in
Nature' - to have been picked out by definjte description of the ring (as
I propose, leaning on the analogy with the guinea passage), or rather by
an implicitly presupposed alternative nominal essence (as the semanti-
cally innocuous theorist must less plausibly suppose).
Finally, there is the section on the 'Difficulty to treat of Words with
Words,' in which Locke candidly admits that his semantic theory threat-
ens to render some of what he wants to say about the signification of
substance-names unsayable:
But I desire, it may be considered, how difficult it is, to lead another by Words into the
Thoughts ofThings, stripp'd of those specifical differences we give them: Which Things,
if I name not, I say nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into some
sort, or other, and suggest to the Mind the usual abstract Idea of that Species; and so
cross my purpose. For to talk of aMan, and to lay by, at the same time, the ordinary
signification of the Name Man, which is our complex Idea, usually annexed to it;
and bid the Reader considerMan, as he is in hirnself, and as he is really distinguished
from others, in his internaI Constitution, or real Essence, that is by something, he
knows not what, looks like trifling.... (IILvi.43: 465-6).
15 For further examples of Locke's nonconstitutive use of 'determine that Species', see
III.xi.20: 519 and IV.xii.14: 648. The subject of the above passage must be the sort,
not the particular ring: nothing is 'inseparable' from an individual considered as
such, nor does it possess iproperties' (IILvi.6: 442).
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The ensuing discussion reveals that the expressive problem once again
pertains to the claim that substance-ideas are 'imperfect, and therefore
various' (IILvi.48: 469 [summary]). For example, Locke wants to say that
the nominal essence of man will always be inadequate to the nature of
that sort of substance - to the nature ofman. Unfortunately, this very
use of the name 'man' (carrying its 'ordinary signification') prevents him
from expressing a thought about the sort intended; to append the phrase
las he is in himself' would be to engage at best in idle 'trifling' with
words. Since it is so difficult to make the points he intends 'by known
familiar Names,' Locke now announces that he will seek to do so by
telling a story that avoids them. Recounting Adam's naming of modes
and substances, he avoids both use and mention of 'familiar names' such
as 'jealousy' and 'gold.' The substitution of Hebrew 'zahab' for English
'gold' in contexts of mention serves only to eliminate any possibility of
use/mention confusion. The crucial substitution is that of 'this Matter'
for 'gold' in contexts ofuse. Presented with a particular 'piece of Matter,'
Adam forms an abstract idea of a few of the sensible qualities he notes
in this object, an idea he chooses to signify by the name 'zahab.' Ul1.sur-
prisingly, this nominal essence is amenable to further perfection:
[T]he inquisitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledge of these, as I may
say, superficial Qualities, puts Adam upon farther Examination of this Matter. He
therefore knocks it, and beats itwith Flints ...: he finds it will bend without breaking.
Is not now Ductility to be added to his former Idea, and make part of the Essence of
the Species, the Name Zahab stands for? ... If [it is], then all the other Properties,
which any farther Trials shall discover in this Matter, ought by the same Reason
to make apart of the Ingredients of the complex Idea, which the Name Zahab stands
for, and so be the Essence of the Species, marked by that Name. Which Properties,
because they are endless, it is plain, that the Idea made after this fashion by this
Archetype, will always be inadequate. (IILvi.47: 469)
Once again, we find Locke attempting to pick out a sort by specifying a
particular. The failure of Adam's complex idea to contain all the 'prop-
erties' in 'this matter' is a failure to match an independently constituted
sort, 'Properties belonging only to Species, and not to Individuals'
(IILvi.6: 442). For that matter, how could a substance-idea's inadequacy
lie in its very generality? That Locke is not complaining about generality
is obvious from his epistemological conclusions: it is 'whilst our complex
Ideas of the sorts of Substances' contain only an 'imperfect Collection' of
their sensible qualities that knowledge of 'general Propositions'·is held
impossible, a predicament that would be avoided were we to possess
'specifick Ideas of their real Essences' (IV.vi.lO: 584, IV.vi.ll: 585).
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4. An essentialist alternative
Where we have found Locke trying to circumvent the apparent bounds
of his official theory of the names of substances, John Troyer views hirn
as describing an alternative manner of using such names. Troyer goes so
far as to credit Locke with an understanding of the reference of natural
kind terms borrowed from Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam: '[t]he exten-
sion of terms like "gold" is determined by the essential features of the
kind of thing' causally-historically related to the term.16 This description
is said to fit one use of substance-names Locke finds available; for
misguided epistemological reasons, he instead advocates a use of sub-
stance-names in accord with nominal-essence semantics. Still, Troyer
insists, he is 'committed to an ontology of real kinds and an account of
names of substances which allows their use as names of these kinds,' on
which they get a grip by courtesy of historically prior ostension.17While
maintaining that Locke deerns such a use of substance-names impossible
and not merely inadvisable, J.L. Mackie shares the view that Locke's
'doctrine of real essences that do not coincide with nominal essences is
implicitly a doctrine of natural kinds.,18 Moreover, Mackie construes
Locke as allowing that reference to these kinds can be secured by express-
ing actual demonstrative thoughts.19 To some extent he is right, for we
have seen Locke resort to just such an identification of substantial kinds
when engaged in the circumvention maneuver.
Nevertheless, nothing along these lines can reflect Locke's considered
position, for he explicitly opposes any suggestion that particular pieces
of matter are pre-sorted into 'real kinds' by nature alone. In his blunt
assessment, 'to talk of specifick Differences in Nature, without reference
to general Ideas and Names, is to talk unintelligibly' (III.vi.5: 441). In
particular, this is the case even if the 'real kinds' are held to be distin-
guished not by Aristotelian differentiae but rather by differences in
corpuscular constitution. Drawing an analogy of 'natural Things' to
watches, Locke derides the believer in such kinds by issuing achallenge:
16 Troyer, 'Locke on the Names of Substances,' 28
17 Ibid.,34
18 J.L. Mackie, Problems from Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976), 88. See also Hilary
Komblith's chapter on 'Locke and Natural Kinds' in Inductive Inference and its
Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
1993),24-5.
19 Mackie, Problems, 97
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[W]hat is sufficient in the inward Contrivance, to make a new Species? There are
some Watches, that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a specifick
difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Physies, and others none; some
have the Balance loose, and others regulated by a spiral Spring, and others by Hogs
Bristles: Are any, or all of these enough to make a specifick difference to the
Workman, that knows each of these, and several other different contrivances, in the
interna1Constitutions ofWatches? (IILvi.39: 463)
Locke's point, aptly summarized by Michael Ayers, is that '[r]eality can
supply resemblances, but resemblances do not constitute natural
boundaries.,20 In order for resemblances between objects to yield a
nontrivial classification into kinds, the relevant respects of resemblance
would need to be settled. Until it is explained how nature accomplishes
this, it will remain unintelligible how even a complete understanding of
the innerworkings of substances could reveal anything about the natural
boundaries of their kinds. Now philosophers such as Putnam typically
da address this challenge to their theories of reference to natural kinds,
for instance by presupposing that relations of relevant similarity are
fixed by a speaker's or a community's interests.21 Indeed, I will ulti-
mately argue that Locke himself espouses such a view: the class of
available taxonomie schemes is severely constrained in that certain
resemblances are rendered salient by norms regulating proper scientific
inquiry. The point, however, is that those who have attributed to him a
reliance on 'real kinds' owe an explanation of how this coheres with his
rejection of specific differences in. nature as unintelligible?2
20 Ayers, Locke, 2: 68. See also §IV of Paul Guyer, 'Locke's Philosophy of Language,'
in The Cambridge Companion to Locke, V. Chappell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1994)
21 See e.g. 'The Meaning of "Meaning",' in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical
Papers, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975),239.
22 Kornblith does address Locke's argument regarding specific differences in nature.
But where Locke 'appears to be offering a conceptual argument' that specific
differences are unintelligible apart from our abstract ideas, Kornblith seeks to reinter-
pret this as the 'empirical argument' that our beliefs about such differences can only
be 'explained' by appeal to 'our own conceptual activity' (Inductive Inference, 45-7).
Despite advancing this argument that the postulation of 'real kinds in nature' is
explanatorily idle, Kornblith adds, Locke elsewhere embraces such kinds (16-17,
23-5). What Locke denies, on this reading, is that real kinds can serve to regulate
taxonomie practice. By contrast, I will argue that to the extent that Locke does
embrace mind-independent kinds, it is precisely in virtue of his explicit recognition
of their regulatory role.
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Worse yet, 1'10t even a metaphysically intelligible pruning of admissi-
ble sortings is likely to pick out, for each ostended individual substance,
a unique sequence of infima species and higher genera that will furnish
the names in our taxonomie hierarchy with suitable natural archetypes.
This is the upshot of Locke's separate empirical argument against Scho-
lastic classificatory essentialism: the encountered diversity of organisms
and minerals exposes the arbitrariness of positing a 'certain number,23 of
real essences, subject to the resulting requirement that all members of a
lowest species share 'exactly the same real internal Constitution,' Le.
exhibit 'no more but an accidental difference' between one anoth.er
(III.x.20: 501, IV.iv.15: 570). For no matter how we try to impose this
scheme on nature, we seem to find members of the same lowest species
distinguished from each other by qualities we have no prior reason to
regard as any more 'accidental' than those 'properties' held to distin-
guish them from members of other species (III.x.20: 501-2, III.vL8: 443).24
In effect, the role of Locke's zoologieal examples is to pose the following
type of question: Even if we grant that 'Man' constitutes a natural kind,
what reason do we have to rule out an equally natural kind further
encompassing those 'Creatures in the World, that have shapes like ours,
but are hairy, and want Language, and Reason,' or for that matter a
narrower one that excludes those similarly shaped rational creatures
'where the Males have no Beards' (III.vi.22: 450)?
23 IILiii.17: 418, III.vi.14-18 [summary]: 448, IV.iv.13: 569; see also IILvi.27: 454, IILx.21:
502.
24 My account of Locke's reasoning owes much to Ayers (Locke, 2: 71-3); where I will
depart from him is in stressing this argument's compatibility with a recognition of
naturally privileged kinds. It is in terms of Locke's skepticism about the utility of
an absolute accident/property distinction that we must understand two passages
seemingly implying that individuals bear properties, contrary to Locke's express
denial. 'If things were distinguished into Species, according to their real Essences,'
Locke argues a mere page after that denial, 'it would be as impossible to find
different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to
find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles' (IILvi.8: 443,
also III.iii.17: 418). Considered in the context of the reductio he is offering, his intent
should be clear. Supposing quantities of vitriol are found to 'betray Qualities so
different from one another, as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary
Chymists,' Locke sees no reason why the chemists may not recognize a narrower
species possessing as a property one or more of the qualities at issue (to be regarded
either as a subspecies of vitriol or perhaps as true vitriol). Were the extension of the
name they use assumed to constitute a Scholastic infima species, this move would be
arbitrarily prec1uded.
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5. Avoiding the dilemma
It is time to survey the exegetical horizon in thewake of the critique I have
offered of both conventionalist and essentialist readings. Wehave found
discussions in theEssay suggesting thatLockeholds ournominal essences
answerable to independently constituted kinds, to which they conform
only inadequately. Th.ough we have yet to understand what this could
mean., we ought to be wary of an overly selective application of Locke's
ownhermeneuticalmaxim 'Si non vis intellegi, debes negZigi' (1II.ix.10: 481).
For itwouldbehard to setaside thesepassages' anti-conventionalist tenor
as a curious anonlaly in an otherwise radically anti-essentialist line of
argument: the two themes are too regularly interspersed and (as will
emerge in Section IV.1) systematically intertwined.25
The need for a reading that takes both themes into account appears all
the more pressing in light of the evolution of Locke's thought. His thesis
that our substance-ideas are imperfect collections of simple ideas is
among the elements that remain most constant between the two drafts
dating from 1671 and the Essay as published in 1689. (Ten years later, as
we saw in my introduction, Locke inserted yet another such statement
into the fourth edition.) In the drafts, though, this thesis is part and parcel
of a doctrine according to which substances are 'made into different sorts
by nature' and a substance-idea is imperfect precisely insofar as it fails
to comprise all the properties that 'necessarily goe to make up any one
species as made & destinguishd into ranks by nature' and 'constitute the
specific difference of things considerd in their own nature.,26 While this
doctrine is pointedly not cashed out in terms of Scholastic substantial
forms/7 it retains features of the traditional account that aren't presup-
25 Two attempts at doing justice to Locke's anti-conventionalist strand without pre-
supposing essentialist metaphysics are Bolton's reading discussed in note 3 and a
reply by Ruth Mattem ('Locke on Natural Kinds as the "Workmanship of the
Understanding",' Locke Newsletter 17 (1986) 45-92, esp. 68). Mattern offers a clear
statement of the seeming tension in Locke, but I am not convinced that her proposed
resolution adequately respects the anti-conventionalism.
26 Locke, Drafts, Draft B, §75: 183, §75: 181n, and §84: 191. See also n.12. Pauline
Phemister points to the traditional nature of Draft B's discussion of natural kinds in
'Real Essences in Particular,' Locke Newsletter 21 (1990) 27-55, at 28-9. Passages like
these may explain Locke's remark to Molyneux about the 'difficulty I often found
my self under when I was writing of that subject [of speciesl, where I was very apt
to suppose distinct species I could talk of without names' (letter of 20. January 1693,
#1592 in The Correspondence ofJahn Locke, E.S. de Beer, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 1976-),
vol. 4: 626).
27 Locke, Drafts, Draft B, §72: 176-7
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posed in the Essay, notably the assumption that particular substances
come sorted by nature in.to unique lowest species, the 'smalest divisions
of things' (whether or not a givell.language has names for them)?8 On
the one hand, then, the semantically innocuous theorist is committed to
the awkward hypothesis that Locke's 'imperfection' language, while
frequently retained verbatim, undergoes a complete shift in meaning
between the drafts and the Essay. (The even less attractive alternative for
those who attribute to Locke an abhorrence of natural kinds would be to
regard the Essay's imperfection thesis as an incongruous holdover from
his earlier thought.) On the other hand, essentialist readings like Troyer's
fail to take into account the Essay's evident departure from the view of
natural kinds endorsed in the drafts. The challenge is thus to devise a
reading by the lights of which Locke retains enough of a belief in
independently constituted kinds to underwrite his thesis of imperfection
(understood as relative to such kinds), while coming to question the
received assumptions conceming the natural basis of taxonomy.
As could be expected, the key to such a Soilltion will be a certain
weakening of the sense of 'independently constituted.' To discover just
what independence of our nominal essences the envisaged sorting en-
joys, we must examine Locke's proposal for how these nominal essences
are to be emended. Their beholdenness to a 'standard made by nature'
is reflected in science's standing obligation to perfect them:
For our Names of Substances being not put barely for our Ideas, but being made use
of ultimately to represent Things ..., their signification must agree with the Truth of
Things, as weIl as with Men's Ideas. And therefore with Substances, we are not
always to rest in the ordinary complex Idea, commonly received as the signification
of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and
Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our
Ideas of their distinct Species; or else learn then1 from such as are used to that sort
of Things; and are experienced in them. For since 'tis intended their Names should
stand for such Collections of simple Ideas, as do really exist in Things themselves ...
therefore to define their Names right, natural History is to be enquired intoi and
their Properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. (III.xi.24: 520-1)
I hope to elucidate what Locke n1eans by the 'Properties of the Things
themselves' by identifying the empirical procedure by which these
properties are to be 'found out,' and asking what benefit could accrue to
the human understanding from following this proced"ure. For present
purposes, a rather crude characterization of the procedure will suffice (a
more determinate readingmust await an answer to the second question).
28 Ibid., §91: 198
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Locke enjoins us to in1prove our substance-ideas by collecting those
simple ideas 'which are constantly and inseparably united in Nature,
and are always to be found together in th.e same Subject' (IILvi.30: 457).
This, of course, is also the content of the injunction cited in my introduc-
tion. Let us fist inquire what readings that reject independently consti-
tuted kinds (h.enceforth 'metaphysically innocuous' readings) might
have to offer regarding the question of what is gained when we thus
'perfeet' our ideas of the sorts of substances. It will turn out that while
the aims these readings may appeal to are indeed important to Locke,
they must be subordinate to the pLlrsuit of conformity to independently
constituted sorts.
111 The Uses of Natural History
1. Reducing arbitrariness
Why is it an inadequacy for the idea of a sort of substance to fail to contain
all the discoverable properties of that sort? The same circumstance
constitutes no inadequacy in ideas of modes: our idea of a triangle is not
rendered inadequate by its failure to include all properties of that geo-
metrie figure (ILxxxi.10: 382). The difference is that the properties of a
triangle at least 'depend on' or 'flow fron1' our idea of a triangle, whereas
the properties of gold do not even depend on the qualities in our complex
idea of gold - but rather 'on that unknown real Essence, onwhich these
also depend' (IV.xii.9: 644). Locke puts this point by saying that in the
species of 'natural Substances' nominal and real essence are not identical,
while these essences coincide in the species of modes an.d sensible
qualities (IILiv.3: 421/ IILiii.18: 418-9/ IILv.14: 436-7).29
29 See Bolton, 'Substances, Substrata, and Names,' 500-1, 503-5. In restricting his claim
to the species of 'natural' substances, Locke acknowledges that the nominal and real
essences of a sort of artifact can coincide, e.g. in the mind of the artificer (see IILvi.40:
464-5). The fact that a sort's possession of its properties rests on a foundation other
than the combination of qualities in its nominal essence may not actually suffice to
establish a divergence betweennominal and real essences. For this, Locke also seems
to require that we intend to hold the nominal essence responsible to something it
only 'inadequately' represents (either the foundation itself or an unknown number
of properties flowing fron1 it). In the case of modes, neither of these two conditions
is satisfied: 'all the properties of the Species' depend on the nominal essence, whence
there is nothing elsewe 'would have express'd' by the name (IILv.14: 436). Secondary
qualities might present a case in which the first condition for divergent essences is
satisfied (cf. Mackie, Problems, 90), but here the second condition clearly is not
(II.xxxi.12: 383).
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Recall that on onemetaphysically innocuous reading, the semantically
innocuous one, all properties of gold are necessary concomitants of the
conjunction of the qualities contained in the nominal essence. This need
not imply that they 'depend' after all on the nominal essence: the
dependence Locke has inmind is an explanatory one. On the semantically
innocuous reading the properties of gold, while necessarily attendant on
the conjunction of the qualities in the nominal essence, are not explained
by them. Rather, these qualities as well as all remaining properties are
explained by the underlying real constitution shared by all and only the
things conforming to the nominal essence. Such considerations indeed
suffice to make sense of a counterfactual situation Locke describes in
whicl1, surprisingly, the real and nominal essences of a geometrie mode
are said to fall apart:
[Ajll our complex Ideas of Substances are imperfeet and inadequate. Which would be
so also in mathematical Figures, if we were to have our eomplex Ideas of them, only
by eolleeting their Properties, in referenee to other Figures. How uneertain, and
imperfeet, would our Ideas be of an Ellipsis, if we had no other Idea of it, but some
few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain Idea, the whole Essenee of that
Figure, we from thenee diseover those Properties, and demonstratively see how
they flow, and are inseparable from it. (II.xxxi.11: 382)
Here it does seem plausible that the hypothesized imperfect idea of an
ellipse is presumed to pick out, necessarily and demonstrably, the very
same geometrical objects as does the actual'Essence of that Figure.' If so,
the general circumstance Locke would be describing is one familiar in
mathematical practice: one definition is often regarded as more appro-
priate than another deductively equivalent one, on the grounds that the
latter is articulated in terms of a set of features lacking explanatory pride
of place.30 More specifically, Locke may be alluding to a long-standing
debate over which (if any) classical geometrical demonstrations proceed
in a manner satisfying the explanatory rigors of Aristotelian science,
namely by deriving properties from the essences on which they de-
pend.31
30 See e.g. Philip Kiteher, 'Explanatory Unification and the Causal Strueture of the
World,' in P. Kiteher and W. Salmon, eds., Scientific Explanation (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press 1989),424-5.
31 See Paolo Maneosu, Philosophy ofMathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seven-
teenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), eh. 1. While the above
analysis of Loeke's example aeeords with the semantieally innoeuous reading, the
same analysis is eonsistent with its rejeetion. Leibniz, for instanee, invokes naturally
privileged ('physieal') speeies whose boundaries are imperfeetly approximated by
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Still, it remains questionable whether considerations of explanatory
virtue alone can underwrite a satisfactory analysis of the imperfection
of substance-ideas. For we must also render intelligible Locke's injunc-
tion to perfect these ideas by incorporating ever more of the substances'
properties, in. light of his insistence that doing so contributes nothing to
the ideas' explanatory potential (11.xxxi.13: 383). A proponent of the
semanticallY innocuous reading might now offer the following reply: in
perfecting our nominal essences, we reduce the arbitrariness involved in
their composition. Assuming, for example, that malleableness necessar-
ily accompanies a certain yellow color and fusibility, there is no reason
why the color and fusibility should be singled out for inclusion in the
nominal essence signified by 'gold', rather than all three qualities, or any
other combination of qualities necessarily picking out the same objects
as the original nominal essence. The orLly non-arbitrary nominal essence
would be the explanatory real essence itself; as we are however ignorant
of this, the least arbitrary decision we can make is the egalitarian one to
incorporate each new property of the substance as it is discovered.
This analysis would account for much of what Locke says about
imperfect collections of properties. Certainly, he emphasizes time and
again that they suffer from arbitrariness:
[Men] make their specifick Ideas of the sorts of Substances, for the most part, of a
few of those simple Ideas which are to be found in them: But these having no original
precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specifick Idea, more than others that
are left out, 'tis plain, that ... our Ideas of Substances are deficient, and inadequate.
(II.xxxi.8: 381; see also III.vi.31: 458, III.ix.13: 482, and the passages from lII.ix.17: 486
and II.vi.47: 469 cited in Section II.3)
Nonetheless, the norm of minimizing arbitrariness fails by itself to
supplya rationale for fOllOwing Locke's perfection procedure. The first
thing to note is that by the lights of the semantically innocuous reading,
there is no reason to believe that the progressive inclusion of empiricallY
our 'provisional' nominal definitions (New Essays, 312, 325, 400ff). Nonetheless, he
presents a nearly identical example, explaining that one can define the parabola in
terms of an 'external feature' and subsequently devise a 'more perfeet idea' by
adding a further such property, all the while unaware of 'the figure's inner essence'
that serves as a 'key to further knowledge' of its properties (346,402) and explains
why they obtain (cf. 295). Given his use of this example as an objection to Locke's
characterization of the substance/mode distinction, it is ironie that Leibniz fails to
recognize Locke's own use of the same example to concede the contingency of the
fact that our modal ideas serve as archetypes and as such 'cannot but be adequate
Ideas' (II.xxxi.3: 376). Cf. Roger Woolhouse, 'Locke's Theory of Knowledge,' in The
Cambridge Companion, 160.
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coexisting qualities into our nominal essences will reduce the arbitrari-
ness of which properties have been included. A permanent decrease in
arbitrariness would only ensue if there came a stage after which we
would invariably identify the additional properties of the sort correctly.
Otherwise our evolving nominal essencewon't remain answerable to the
same 'perfect collection' of properties, and there can be no meaningful
comparison of the arbitrarinesses involved in two nominal essences
answerable to distinct archetypes (as Locke insists, there will in both
cases be an 'endless' number of arbitrarily omitted properties). But
wh.ich further sensible qualities necessarily accompany those in a nomi-
nal essence is something concerning which we can at best conjecture,
moreover with seemingly irremediable unreliability, as is witnessed by
the 'sad Experience' often made by Locke's 'very wary Chymists' who
'seek for the sanle Qualities in one parcel of 5ulphur, Antimony, or
Vitriol, which they have found in others' (1II.vi.8: 443). Hence, if reduced
arbitrariness ofproperty-inclusion were the basic aim ofidea-perfection through
natural history, the semantically innocuous account of propertyhood
would render th.at procedure pointless. Yet the only motive for viewing
reduction of arbitrariness as the basic aim of idea-perfection appears to
be the semantically innocuous reading itself, which requires that the
standards for idea-revision be fixed by the contents of the ideas them-
selves. It follows that reduced arbitrariness cannot by itself account for
the desirability of following Locke's procedure. (On the other hand,
should this procedure turn out to ensure that our nominal essences
approach independently constituted 'perfect collections' of properties,
their approach to such standards would naturally qualify as a decrease
in the arbitrariness of the list of included sensible qualities.)
2. Remedying confusion
So far, we have been viewing Locke's procedure for perfecting a sub-
stance-idea as in a strict sense a procedure for discovering the properties
of the respective sort of substance. What its properties are has been taken
to be a matter settled independently of the results of this procedure,
determined either by what qualities necessarily follow from those in our
nominal essence (on the semantically innocuous reading) or by what
qualities characterize a sort provided by nature (on the essentialist
reading). What if we were to give up this assumption? Could it be that
the revision process itself is constitutive of propertyhood, so that what-
ever qualities come to be included in the nominal essence to which I
annex the name 'gold' are ipso facta properties of that substance? In
carrying out the procedure Locke describes we are, of course, closely
constrained by our experience of what qualities have hitherto been
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cOl1.stantly coinstantiated. Yet there always remains a degree of arbitrari-
ness: just which such qualities get combined in a particular nominal
essence 'depends upon the various Care, Industry, or Fancy ofhim that makes
it' (IILvi.29: 456); another investigator might have 'made other Trials'
(IILix.13: 483). Since our successive trials for coinstantiation of new
qualities will be performed on an ever-expanding set of objects, even the
order in which they are perfornled nlay affect what qualities end up in
the nominal essence.
This brand of reading carries the attraction of being metaphysically
innocuous, yet promising an understanding ofLocke's insistence that our
nominal essence of a substantial sort never includes all the properties of
that sort. Indeed, I will eventually conclude that the most charitable
reconstruction of Locke's revision process does construe it as constitutive
of propertyhood. (To be precise: though Locke never acknowledges that
a substance's set of properties may always depend on contingel1.cies of
future inquiry, he does appear to conceive of the revision process as one
guaranteed to yield only genuine properties.) Still, a crucial element is
missing. According to the reading as it has been described, some sortings
are better than othersmerely by virtue of their having been further refined
in conformity with Locke's empirical procedure. But why should the
procedure be accorded such standing? One possible answer would be
that following Locke's procedure yields sortings tl1.at are preferable to
their predecessors ongeneral pragmaticgrounds. This is the rationale Ayers
sees as underlying Loeke's taxonomie proposals (though he does not
advocate the understanding of 'properties' under consideration):
Crudely, the particular complex perceptible things in existence ... constitute a vast
plurality of machines among which there may be natural structural resemblances,
but no two of which, for all we know, are precisely alike. Howwe should rank them
on the basis of our observational knowledge is a matter to be more or less pragmati-
cally determined. We should do so in a way which marks differences that are
important to us and which at the same time fits our language for the purposes of
communication.32
Now Ayers's first pragmatic consideration, that of marking 'differences
that are important to us,' will be irrelevant to the present question in the
absence of an explanation of why this general aim should motivate the
collecting of constantly conjoined qualities in substances, an activity it
doesn't motivate in the case of modes. More promising is Ayers' second
consideration, namely that Locke proposes a 'method for raising lan-
guage above the confusions of its "civil" use, so as to give it scientific or
32 Ayers, Locke, 2: 67
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"philosophical" precision and consistency.' According to Ayers, it is
ultimately for the sake of the 'avoidance of confusion' that we who are
engaged in the natural sciences should 'improve and remodel our defi-
nitions in the light of experience.,33
It is true that Locke describes the 'doubtfulness and uncertainty of their
signification' as the 'imperfection' to which our use of words is subject
(III.ix.4: 477), since it interferes with their communicative purpose. (Such
uncertainty is one of the circumstances in which Locke says we may
speak of 'confused' ideas - cf. II.xxix.9: 366.) Moreover, careful obser-
vation of correlated qualities might indeed help me meld, out of the
disparate criteria by which I find myself recognizing gold on different
occasions, a precise set of criteria acceptable to me and worth promoting
to interlocutors.
Again, one maywonder how Ayers canaccountJor the fact thatmatters
are different in the case of modes. But there is a more immediate
difficulty: it remains mysterious how this desideratum could motivate
the progressive accumulation of additional properties mandated by
Locke's program of idea-perfection.34 Locke is weH aware that the obli-
gation of those engaged in 'philosophical discourse' to perfect their
substance-ideas is itself one of the main causes of confusion, and thus
can't simply be motivated as its remedy. Listing several circumstances
conducive to uncertainty about the precise signification of words, he
includes both the case where there is 'no settled Standard, any where in
Nature existing, to rectify and adjust [their signification] by' and the case
where 'the signification of the Word is referred to a Standard, which
Standard is not easy to be known' (III.ix.5: 477). Lack of beholdenness to
an external standard is conducive to disagreement as to the signification
of the names of modes (III.ix.7-10: 478-81). The absence of this circum-
stance ensures that substance-names are less prone to confusion, at least
in their everyday 'civiI' use:
Because in Substances, (especially those, which the common and unborrowed
Names of any Language are applied to,) some remarkable sensible qualities, serving
ordinarily to distinguish one sort from another, easily preserve those, who take any
33 Ayers, Locke, 2: 75; see also Guyer, 'Locke's Philosophy of Language,' 143. For
Locke's distinctionbetween 'civil' and 'philosophical Discourse,' see IILix.3: 476 and
IILix.15: 484.
34 Ayers never claims it does: it isn't clear he sees any connection between Locke's
advocacy of natural history and his thesis that our substance-ideas are 'imperfect
and inadequate' (see esp. Locke, 2: 76).
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Care in the use of their Words, from applying them to sorts of Substances, to which
they do not belong. (II.xxxii.l0: 387; see also lII.ix.15: 484)
In the case of substance-names in 'philosophieal' use, however, there is
a 'contrary reason' for concern: the reason such names are said to be 'of
a very unsteady and various meaning' is that the ideas they signify are
properly 'referred to Standards without us, that ... can be known but
imperfectly and uncertainly' (1II.ix.11: 481-2). Once science embarks on the
Lockean progran1 of perfecting substance-ideas based on empirical tri-
als, their very beholdenness to a standard in nature turns into a fertile
source of confusion: 'that confusion, which comes from several Persons,
applying the same Name to a Collection of a smaller, or greater number
of sensible Qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less
acquainted with, or accurate in examining the Qualities of any sort of
things' (1II.xi.25: 522). The reason Locke's 'very learned and ingenious
Physicians' disagree on what would count as 'liquor' (1II.ix.16: 484-5) is
surely thatbetween themselves they have uncovered a variety of constant
concomitances, in accordance with which each has framed his complex
idea somewhat differently. Of course, Locke urges 'Men, versed in
physical Enquiries' to remedy this confusion through greater care in
coordinating nominal essences (1II.xi.25: 521). But their responsibility to
perfeet substance-ideas on the basis of empirical regularities needs to be
motivated in the first place.
3. Converging on areal essence
I have been seeking to bolster the hypothesis that Locke's taxonomie
methodology furthers the conformity of ideas to a 'standard made by
nature' in a sense stronger than metaphysically innocuous readings will
stomaeh. Yet, given Locke's anti-essentialism, failure to meet this stand-
ard can't be taken as lack of match with a particular ostensively identi-
fiable 'real kind.' Instead, I will argue, the imperfection of our
substance-ideas reflects their failure to match any of a privileged class of
kinds, namely those that are characterized by shared structure at the
level that is explanatory of sensible qualities. This solution rejects the
prevalent view of the relation between substantial sorts' real and nomi-
nal essences, which holds that each nominal essence corresponds to an
explanatory real essence that picks out exactly the same particulars.
Consider how Ayers introduces Locke's distinction:
He held that what sets a boundary to the class is always what he calls the "nominal
essence," i.e. the abstract idea that embodies our criteria for the application of the
kind-name or "sortal" .... Those aspects of the structure of the individual members
of a species [so defined] which they have in common and in virtue ofwhich they possess
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the defining properties ofthe species, comprise what Locke called the "real essence" of
the species.35
Locke himself characterizes the relation between the nominal and real
essences of substances as follows:
[I] call [the abstract idea of a sort] by a peculiar name, the nominal Essence, to
distinguish it from that real Constitution of Substances, upon which depends this
nominal Essence, and all the Properties of that Sort; which therefore, as has been
said, may be called the real Essence: v.g. the nominal Essence of Gold, is that complex
Idea thewordGold stands for, let it be, for instance, a body yellow, of a certainweight,
malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real Essence is the constitution of the insensible
parts of that Body, on which those Qualities and all the other Properties of Gold
depend. (IILvi.2: 439)
Unless we presuppose the semantically innocuous reading, there is no
assurance here that the real essence is a constitution all things conform-
ing to the nominal essence must share: rather, it is shared by the things
possessing all the properties of the substance, including those not con-
tained in the imperfect nominal essence (and which things conforming
to that abstract idea might lack).
For Locke, the existence of areal essence underlying most (experi-
enced) instantiations of the nominal essence appears to be the conclu-
sion of an inference to a common cause of those qualities united in the
nominal essence. What the prevalent view doesn't sufficiently stress is
the natllre of the premise h.e deman.ds for such an inference. It is not
enough that we have occasionally found certain qualities conjoined;36
35 Ayers, Locke, 2: 67-8 (my italies), 38, 70; see also Phemister, 'Real Essences,' 35-6,
45-6; Peter Alexander, Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External
World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984), chapter 13, esp. 273; R.5.
Woolhouse, Locke's Philosophy ofScience and Knowledge (New York: Barnes & Noble
1971), 118-19.
36 Ayers does note this qualification: 'In general there is the implicit suggestion that
repeated observation of coexisting qualities and powers is requisite to justify the
presumption of a recurrent underlying cause of their union, and so to justify the
formation of a complex idea' (Locke, 2: 79-80). See also Woolhouse, who makes the
further claim that correlations are at issue (Locke's Philosophy ofScience, 117-18, 132).
In neither case does the restriction constitute a general abandonment of the tradi-
tional picture: neither author connects the failure of a nominal essence to be deter-
mined by areal essence with its 'imperfection' or 'inadequacy/ adefeet both appear
to account for via the semantically innocuous reading (Woolhouse, Locke's Philoso-
phy ofScience, 120; Ayers, Locke, 1: 102,2: 76). I know of only one reader of the Essay
who has both recognized the role of correlations and suggested a connection
between microstructural uniformity and 'adequacy': Richard Boyd, 'Realism, Anti-
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what is required for the inference is their constant coexistence: 'The
complex Ideas we have of Substances, are ... certain Collections of simple
Ideas, that have been observed or supposed constantly to exist together'
(II.xxxi.6: 379, II.xxxii.18: 390-1). Again, 'Men, observing certain Quali-
ties always join'd and existing together, therein copied Nature; and of
Ideas so united, made their complex ones of Substances' (III.vi.28: 456).
It is these correlations, I submit, that license the inference to a comn1011
underlying constitution:
[W]e come to have the Ideas of particular sorts of Substances, by collecting such
Combinations of simple Ideas, as are byExperience and Observation ofMen's Senses
taken notice of to exist tagether, and are therefore supposed to flow from that
particular internal Constitution, or unknown Essence of that Substance. (II.xxiii.3:
296)
Though the requirement that the qualities have 'constantly' or 'usually'
been found together is not expressly stated here, it figures three times in
the immediate vicinity (II.xxiii.1: 295, II.xxiii.4: 297, II.xxiii.6: 298).
What would it be for shining yellow color, a particular density, and
fusibility to have been observed 'always join'd and existing together'?
Clearly, it will suffice that all coinstantiatiol1s of two of these qualities
have been found invariably accompal1ied by the third: all objects of that
color and density have been found fusible, all fusible objects of that
density have been found to possess that color, etc.37 These mutual
correlations should alreadymake it reasonable to assume that the objects
typically share a common structure at the explanatory - for Locke, the
microscopic -level of description, one that accounts for their correlated
qualities. (For the moment, let us ignore the possible existence ofmultiple
such generally shared structures, a complication Locke will be found to
show no sign of appreciating.) Still, there willlikely be instantiations,
both actual and merely possible, that lack this structure. Each such case
will surely be distinguishable from the former sampies by failure to
exhibit some further quality, say solubility in aqua regia. As we include
ever more of these correlated qualities in our nominal essence, the idea
Foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds,' Philosophical Studies 61
(1991) 127-48, at 130-3.
37 Compare the slightly weaker condition in Draft B: An Englishman's 'complex Idea
of a Swan is a kinde of affirmation that where such a kinde of shape colour bignesse
with such anecke & legs doth exist there also whole feet are joynd with them or
such a kinde of voice as that of a swan iso i.e. where a great number of those simple
Ideas doe exist togeather that the rest are also' (Locke, Drafts, Draft B, §63: 166-7; see
also Draft A, §1: 4-5).
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is that the nominal essence will come ever closer to pickin_g out some
particular explanatory constitution.38 Locke characterizes the real es-
sence whose existence we 'suppose' as 'tllat real constitution of any
Thing, which is the foundation of all those Properties, that are combined
in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal Essence' (1ILvi.6:
442). In view of his requirement that properties be added to a sort's
nominal essence as they are 'found out,' I suggest we construe this
formulation as alluding to the output of an indefinitely iterable proce-
dure for revising a nominal essence by searching for additional con-
stantly coexisting qualities. The substance's real essence can then be
specified as the explanatory-Ievel constitution picking out exactly those
objects that conform to the llominal essence in the procedure's limit as
the nominal essence approaches a 'perfect Collection of [the substance's]
Properties' (1II.vi.19-20: 449 [sLlmmary]), a collection containing 'all tlle
simple Ideas, that are united in Nature' (ILxxxii.18: 391, IILvi.30: 457).
Locke's appeal to common cause inference readily accounts for why
modal ideas, unlike those of substances, carrywith them no commitment
to the existence of a microstructural real essence. OLlr substance-ideas
are the ones we compile and revise on the basis of experienced constant
conjunctions of sensible qualities, themselves held to result from the
structures thiIlgS possess at a distinct corpuscular level of description.
This practice ul'lderwrites a commitment to the existence of a microstruc-
tural common cause of these component qualities, one that is responsible
for most instances of their coinstantiation. By contrast, ideas of modes
are not held responsible to experienced constant conjunctions of sensible
qualities, whence they give rise to no such commitment.39 Recognizing
38 Mackie allows that Locke 'hints vaguely at this sort of progress' (Problems, 98n), and
Kornblith sketches a similar account of Locke's implicit understanding of 'chemical
method' (Inductive Inference, 26-8), one he says 'flatly contradicts' Locke's 'official
position' that 'real kinds' can exercise no constraint on taxonomie practice (17).
Besides my denial that Locke espouses that position, the main discrepancy between
our readings lies in Kornblith's insistence, based on a failure to distinguish Locke's
'properties' from 'qualities,' that any difference in qualities implies two thing can't be
members of the same 'real kind' (26-8, 36-7). This may explain his attribution to
Locke of the view that '[w ]ere we in a position to observe [corpuscular structure],
we would see directly how it is that nature divides the world into kinds' (17).
39 I don't wish to imply that the characterization of substance-ideas as those intended
to represent kinds with causally explanatory real essences fully accounts for Locke's
substance/mode distinction. Following Woolhouse and others, I suspect the dis-
tinction involves aseparate and potentially orthogonal ontological strand (Locke's
Philosophy of Science, chs. 4 and 7; Mackie, Problems, 99-100; Ayers, Locke, 2: eh. 8).
Whether and how each of these strands is associated with the idea of 'substance in
general' are vexed questions beyond this paper's scope.
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the supposition of an underlying real essence as the upshot of a comn1on
cause inference should also provide the key to understanding Locke's
repeated claim that the substantial sort's real essence not only explains
a member's possession of each of the sensible qualities contained in the
nominal essence, but can additionally explain how these are 'united
together in the sameSubject' (IV.vi.15: 590; also 1ILvi.6: 442, 1ILix.12: 482).
At issue, the present account suggests, is an implicitly presupposed
distinction between a microstructure that is a genuinely common cause
of the con.joined qualities and a mere conjunction of their respective
microstructural causes.
While the essentials of how I propose to reconstruct Locke's proce-
dure for revising nominal essences should already be clear, it may help
to make the details explicit. Let us call an unordered n-tuple of qualities
C a 'candidate,40 provided each (n - l)-tuple subset C' of C is such that
all hitherto observed coinstantiations of all members of C' have been
found to feature the remaining quality in C as weIl. At each stage of
revision, a newly perfected substance-idea is required to be composed
of a collection of simple ideas corresponding to a candidate, as well as
the further idea of 'Substance in general' (ILxxiii.3: 296). Locke enjoins
us to perfect each substance-idea based on a collection 5 of qualities
according to the following rule: should we discover a quality q   5 such
that the union 5 u {q} is a candidate, we must base our emended
substance-idea on this candidate.
Actually, there remains a complication. Let Gbe any candidate for the
idea signified by 'gold,' K the set of features defining a cube, and P the
set of features defining a regular polyhedron whose surface area is six
times the square of its edge length (I am assuming that neither K nor P
is itself a candidate). According to the definition given above, the union
G u K u P is a candidate: each of this set's members has been found
constantly conjoined with the conjunction of the remaining ones. But do
we want to recognize golden cube as a privileged kind? As a matter of
fact, Locke expressly rules it out, his ground presumably being the
unavailability (predictable based on experience of similar substances) of
a common cause inference, i.e. the fact that the set G u K is no candidate:
40 I have adapted this term, as weH as the idea of a semantic 'revision procedure,' from
Anil Gupta's writings on truth.
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Whoever first light on a parcel of that sort of Substance, we denote by the word Gold,
could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he observed in that lump, to depend
on its real Essence, or internaIConstitution. Therefore those never went into his Idea
of that Species of Body.... (ILxxxi.9: 381).
To exclude the nominal essence G u K u P and like cases, Locke might
have imposed the following restriction. Each candidate C must contain
at least one quality q such that if coinstantiations of the qualities in any
subset 5 of C - {q} have always been found to be accompanied by q, then
they have also always been found to be accompanied by every other
n1ember of C - S.
Though probably still too simplistic,41 the preceding explication of
how Ollr substance-ideas are to be perfected can roughly accommodate
all but one of Locke's discussions of the possible careers of the significa-
tion of 'gold.' Unsurprisingly, the exception is the parable ofAdamwith
its aberrant essentialist presuppositions (which I have argued should be
read as a misguided evasive maneuver provoked by the threat Locke's
semantics poses to the expressibility of his imperfection thesis). My
explication accords particularly closely with Locke's claim that the mind
commits a 'mistake' when
having joined the Ideas of substance, yellow, malleable, most heavy, and fusible, it
takes that complex Idea to be the complete Idea of Gold, when yet its peculiar
fixedness and solubility inAqua Regia are as inseparable from those other Ideas, or
Qualities of that Body, as they are from one another. (II.xxxii.23: 392; cf. also
IILvi.31: 458, lII.ix.13: 483, IILix.17: 485-6, IILv.19: 501, and IV.xii.9: 645)
It is evidently the availability of an expanded candidate that ShOV.1S the
nominal essence in question to be incomplete and in need of revision.42
Although he doesn't believe we can ever in fact achieve a 'perfect
discovery of all those Qualities [of natural things], which would best
shew us their most material differences and agreements' (III.vi.30: 458),
Locke's revision procedure is designed to bring our taxonomy of sub-
stances into increasing accordance with a standard of materiality. Locke
nowhere defends his view that the resulting classifications deserve to
count as 'material' (also III.vi.29: 456), but one implicit incentive for
following his injunction should be apparent: as a nominal essence is
41 In particular, I see little reason why Locke wouldn't allow the expansion ofnominal
essence by a number of qualities simultaneously, should no single quality be
discoverable.
42 Locke gives a more detailed explanation of the 'mistake & error' Drafts, in Draft B,
§93i: 205-6 (cf. also IILvi.29: 456).
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perfected, we can expect additional empirical generalizations of increas-
ing accuracy (in view of the unlikelihood that the underlying real essence
is disposed to manifest itself phenomenally in only the ways we have
happened to compile in our nominal essence). Hence perfecting a given
conception of what counts as a 'like' body should boost the reliability
with whichwe are able 'by Analogy to guess what Effects the like Bodies
are, upon other tryals, like to produce' (IV.iii.29: 560). This is presumably
why 'a Man accustomed to rational and regular Experiments shall be
able to see farther into th.e Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their
yet ul1.kl1.own Properties, than one, that is aStranger to them' (IV.xii.lO:
645; cf. III.vi.24: 452). And it is surely that benefit that earns the perfeetion
of substance-ideas and accordingly of 'experimental Knowledge'
(IV.iii.29: 560, IV.vi.7: 582) its prominent place on Locke's list of 'ways to
enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable' (IV.xii.14: 648).43
IV Lockean Natural Kinds
1. Prefixed bounds
It is a dogma of the dominant view that the role of Locke's microstruc-
tural real essences - by contrast with the dual role of Aristotelian
essences - is explanatory and not also classificatory.44 Now it is true
Locke holds that our sorting would be no less arbitrary if, per impossibile,
it could be based directly on differences in corpuscular constitution. If
the present reading is right, however, what has been neglected is the
interrelation of corpuscular and phenomenallevels. Phenomenal classi-
fications need not be congruent to corpuscular ones: nominal essences
generally fail to pick out a class of things possessing a common corpus-
cular structure. (Nor, presumably, will every such structure give rise to
a collection of sensible qualities.) Nonetheless, the more 'perfeet' or
'complete' we render a nominal essence, the closer Locke believes we
approach some sort for which there exists an underlying real essence
explanatory of the appearances defining it. And our interest in such
sorts (based at least partially on an interest in inductive robustness) is
43 The present reading thus lends support to Boyd's conjecture that Locke's solution
to the 'problem of the "inadequacy" of kinds of substances' is intended to apply to
the 'problem of inductive categories' as wen ('Enthusiasn1 for Natural Kinds,'
131-2).
44 See e.g. Ayers, Locke, 2: 67-8; Guyer, 'Locke's Philosophy of Language,' 131; Wool-
house, Locke's Philosophy ofScience, 101.
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what justifies holding certain of our complex ideas accountable to such
a norm of completeness. In short, the explanatory role of real essen.ces
affords them a classificatory role as weIl: we have reason to prefer
classifications on the basis of how close they come to congruence with
real essences.
There is thus something right after all about intuitions that Locke's
theory of substances concerns natural kinds. But while Locke agrees that
there is a privileged sorting to which our nominal essences must answer,
this sorting is not entirely independent of the human. understanding. To
start with, which internal constitutions are available as the targets of
Lockean revision to our nominal essences clearly depends on what
simple ideas we are fitted to receive. In Locke's view, the substances in
our environment do not in any absolute sense 'naturally sort themselves
out into separate species or natural kinds' (as Mackie suggests he should
have conceded45), but they do sort themselves into such kinds relative to
our particular sensory faculties. Most importantly, the fact that they do
so is itself a reflection of the interest we take in sorts determined by
internal constitutions. As we are about to be reminded, however, these
general considerations don't exhaust the understanding's involvement
in determining the natural standards to which particular taxonomic
names are 'referred.'
In forming nominal essences, Locke claims, there is a moment of
constraint and a moment of arbitrariness: 'Those [names] of Substances,
are not perfectly [arbitrary]; but referr to a pattern, though with some
latitude' (1II.iv.17: 428, also III.vi.28: 455). The latitude lies primarily in
the abundance of available targets. The constraint by patterns in nature
lies in the fact that there is such a thing as being off target, and in the
existence of a methodology for gradually cottoning on to one. Viewed in
this light, I will now argue, Locke's otherwise noncommittal-soun.ding
reflections on the existence of 'prefixed bounds' can be seen to issue
from an elaborate two-part line of reasoning that extends throughout
III.vi.29-33. The argument's conclusion is stated twice in close proxim-
ity:
[We] have reason to conclude, that though the nominal Essences of Substances, are
all supposed to be copied from Nature; yet they are all, or most of them, very
imperfect ... and therefore, that these Boundaries of Species, are as Men, and not
as Nature rnakes thern, if at least there are in Nature any such prefixed Bounds....
[T]he sorting of Things by us, or the making of determinate Species, being in order
to naming and comprehending them under general terms, I cannot see how it can
be properly said, that Nature sets the Boundaries of the Species of Things: or if it
45 Mackie, Problems, 87
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be so, our Boundaries of Species, are not exactly confonnable to those in Nature.
For we, having need of general names for present use, stay not for a perfect
discovery of all those Qualities, which would best shew us their most material
differences and agreements.... (III.vi.30: 457-8)
As Ayers notes, Locke 'seems explicitly to have made the concession that
natural boundaries might exist.' The question then arises whether this is
the 'concession of a genuine possibility' at odds with Locke's preferred
position, or rather (as Ayers argues) merely a concession 'for th.e sake of
argument.146 In fact, however, matters are more puzzling. Notice how
Locke justifies his two claims that if there are natural boundaries, our
nominal essences don't match them. In both cases, he does so by reiterating,
outside the scope of any hypothetical assumption of natural boundaries,
the conclusion of the standard argument he has just rehearsed: our
nominal essences must be 'very imperfect' since it is impossible to
discover 'all those [simple ideas], which are united in Nature' (IILvi.30:
457; the argument is repeated in IILvi.31). As we have seen, such imper-
fection is indeed a failure to match a naturally privileged kind.47 In the
context of this manner of justifying the above conditional, how canLocke
consistently profess skepticism about natural boundaries?
The same puzzle is posed by Locke's subsequent expression of frus-
tration that his words get in his way wh.en he tries to 'speak of the
supposed real Essences and Species of Things/ as thought to be made by
Nature, if it be but only to make it understood that there is no such thing
signified by the general Names, which Substances are called by'
(IILvi.43: 466). Once again, Locke seems to be suggesting that nature
doesn't actually draw the boundaries it is 'thought' to/ but that even if it
did, the significations of our general names wouldn't match them. And
once again he proceeds to show (by way of the tale of Adam) that in
forming a substance-idea we in fact do have a 'Standard made by
Nature,' the problem being that our idea 'will be always inadequate' by
this standard (IILvi.46-7: 468-9). How can Locke twice defend his condi-
tional claim using an argument that works only by presupposing the very
46 Ayers, Locke, 2: 71
47 Ayers rejects any such reading (Locke, 2: 76), whence it is unclear how he thinks the
imperfection of our substance-ideas could even be relevant to Locke's claim that our
species-boundaries wouldn't match supposed natural ones. I suspect the reason
Ayers doesn't notice this difficulty lies in his neglecting to distinguish between the
'imperfection' of substance-ideas at issue here (their 'inadequacy' or failure to
perfectly represent their archetypes) and the 'imperfection' of substance-names (the
uncertainty of their signification).
Toward 'Perfeet Collections ofProperties' 585
antecedent toward which he simultaneously expresses a skeptical atti-
tude?
The answer is that contrary to what we first assumed, the clause
starting 'if it be so' doesn't play the role of a genuine conditional. Locke
is distinguishing two senses in which nature could be 'said' to set the
boundaries of species. In one sense of this expression nature does estab-
lish boundaries, he tells us, while in a more exacting sense it does not.
The role of the phrase 'if it be so' is to invoke the weaker of these two
senses; at the same time, Locke indicates his own preference for using the
expression 'boundary set by nature' to signify the more exacting notion.
Each of the senses of 'natllral boundary' corresponds to a different way
in which our substance-ideas can and will be 'imperfect.' Notice that
Locke justifies his reluctance to speak of 'boundaries in nature' by
pointing out that our sortal names are intended to function as 'general
terms.' Elaborating further in IILvi.32, he stresses that substance-ideas
are 'designedly imperfect' by virtue of their very generality, since '[t]he
more general our Ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are.'
Such imperfection is said to be 'visible at first sight' in the case of the
h.igher genera (IILvi.32: 459 [inel. summary]). But if my idea of metal is
held to be more incomplete and imperfect than my idea of gold, the
operative sen.se of perfection or completeness is clearly not a normative
one: the former idea isn't any more 'inadequate.' Indeed, the imperfec-
tion of nominal essences in this sense is 'adjusted to the true end ofSpeech'
(IILvi.33: 460), by permitting the communication of thoughts of suitable
generality. There remains of course the separate normative sense of
perfection: the sense inwhich the idea of a sort of substance is compiled
'by some [men] more, and others less accurately' (III.vi.31: 458), and in
which our ideas of gold and possibly also ofmetal are in constant need of
further perfeetion through pursuit of natural history (if they are to serve
as the significations of substance-names used in 'philosophical dis-
course,).48
48 It may appear that Locke is not contrasting two imperfections that are always
present, but rather our normatively imperfect ideas of the 'lowest 5pecies' with our
designedly imperfect ideas of the 'more comprehensive Classes' (III.vi.32: 459).
Clearly, Locke doesn't restrict designed imperfection to higher genera: just as the 'the
Genus, or more comprehensive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the 5pecies,'
so also the '5pecies [is] but a partial [dea of what is to be found in each individual'
(460). But might he not countenance a privileged category of 'specific' nominal
essences, conceived as the only ones to which the normative notion is applicable,
perhaps those intended to represent naturally lowest species? (This is Liebniz's view
of definition in the New Essays, 401-2.) The passage I am about to display confirms
the conclusions of Section 11.4 in denying 'just Authority' to our privileging of any
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The two types of imperfection are juxtaposed even more directly in
the perfectly parallel argun1ent of III.ix.11-14. First, Locke describes the
familiar normative imperfection deriving from constraint by a 'Standard
in Nature,' given the fact that 'the Properties of any sort of Bodies [are]
not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of enquiry,
which our Faculties are capable of' (III.ix.13: 483). Next, starting a new
section, he adduces the additional non-normative imperfection deriving
from the availability of ideas of many different degrees of generality:
Besides, there is scarce any particular thing existing, which, in some of its simple
Ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others with a less number of
particular Beings:Who shall determine in this Case, which are those that are to n1ake
up the precise Collection, that is to be signified by the specifick Name; or can with
any just Authority prescribe, which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out;
or which more secret, or more particular are to be put into the signification of the
name of any Substance? (IILix.14: 483)
'Allwhich together,' he concludes with unmistakable reference to the two
types of imperfection, 'seldom or never fail to produce that various and
doubtful Signification in the names ofSubstances, which causes such Uncer-
tainty, Disputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philosophical Use of
them' (III.ix.14: 484).
Locke's distinction points to a simple resolution of the puzzle posed
above: the normative imperfection of our substance-ideas reflects the
sense in which nature could be said to determine the boundaries ofspecies,while
their non-normative imperfection helps account for the equally impor-
tant sense in which it does not. What remains unclear is whether Locke
would allow that even when his prescription for perfecting a given
nominal essence is assiduously followed, exactly which natural kind the
procedure will converge on may depend on contingent features of the
future course of inquiry. (For example, timely encounter of a platypus
could prevent investigators whose initial nominal essence comprised
lactation and hirsuteness from cottoning on to a kind encompassing only
viviparous mammals.) Most likely his appreciation of the availability of
target kinds of varying generality extends only to the context of the intra-
and interpersonal regimentation of 'confused' nominal essences. I find no
evidence tl1at Locke recognizes the 'latitude' in question as infecting the
level of generality: Locke's 'specific' ideas are distinguished only relative to a stage
of inquiry. If Locke does mean to restrict his inadequacy thesis to just these sub-
stance-ideas, it would have to be for a pragmatic reason, e.g., to ensure that
idea-perfection preserves our current hierarchy's subsumption-relations.
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further filoment of linguistic reform that consists in the empirically
guided perfeetion of determinate substance-ideas.49
2. The names of substances
Interpreted as I have been proposing, can Locke avoid having his words
'cross [his] purpose' (1II.vi.43: 465)? Less cryptically, is his embrace of a
qualified mind-independence of substantial kinds compatible with his
nominal-essence semanties? The difficulty lies in making room for the
locutions exemplified in the following two claims, to which I have
argued Locke acknowledges commitment:
(1) A piece of metal conforming to the nominal essence of gold could
fai! to display all the properties of gold, in which case it would
lack the real essence of gold.
(2) Two different complex ideas, moreover ones that pick out distinct
sets of conforming things, may both be ideas of gold.
I believe that such a reconciliation canbe achieved, and that the resulting
view of taxonomie names incorporates important aspects of Locke's
outlook. It would of course be disingenuous to advertise it as 'Locke's
theory of natural kind terms': we must bear in mind that Locke's two
most explicit attempts at overcoming the inexpressibility problem tacitly
presuppose metaphysics directly at odds with the Essay's anti-essential-
ism.
What is needed is an interpretation of the expression 'the real essence
of gold,' in view of Locke's observation that taking this essence to be a
constitution shared by everything that is gold renders 'jargon' of claim
(1). In a moment of palpable frustration, Locke hirnself proposes an
unsatisfactory alternative: the real essence of gold is the underlying
constitution shared by just those things that belong to the sort of sub-
stance of which the last-coined guinea is composed. I now suggest we
adapt instead Locke's device of semantic ascent (from II.xxxi.9-10) and
gloss 'the real essence of gold' as 'the underlying constitution shared by
just those things that belong to the sort for which I use the name 11gold." ,
In turn, as above, let us identify that sort of substance with whatever
natural kind th.e collection of qualities signified by 'gold' will cotton on
49 Moreover, it may not be easy to correct this 'oversight.' The presumption that
Locke's revision procedurewill converge on some natural kind would stand in need
of justification, and may conflict with belief in the plenitude of such kinds.
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to in the limit ofmy practice of inquiry. Clearly, something may conform
to my nominal essen.ce while lacking the underlying structure constitu-
tive of this natural kind. Regarding claim (2), let us imagine for the sake
of an. example that the complex idea Robert Boyle signified by the name
'gold' allows some parcels of matter to pass muster that do not conform
to the idea John Locke signified by that name. Locke would nonetheless
have referred to Boyle's idea as an 'idea of gold.' According to the
Lockean theory I wish to sketch, he would have been correct on the
assumption that their ideas are caught up in respective practices of
inquiry that will cotton on to the same natural kind, a circumstance also
expressible by saying that they used their respective names for the same
sort of substance. (lf we recognize a multiplicity of available targets for
idea-perfection governed by Locke's revision procedure, we will be
allowing the very identity of that sort to depend on the course of
post-Lockean chemical inquiry.)
On this oddly bifurcated view of mental content, substance-ideas
carry a world-directedness distinct from that determined by what it
takes to conform to them: they are additionally sorted according to what
kinds they are ideas of The semantic consequences will be readily appar-
ente Despite using the word 'gold' for gold, John Locke might have
asserted a truth in predicating that word of something that was actually
not gold (similarly, it is possible for me to truly predicate a substance-
name of an object that falls outside the sort for which I use that name).
Thus the theory supplies a way of talking about what people use their
words for that carries no consequences for the truth of what they say. The
bulk of the present paper has been devoted to establishing that Locke
does deliberately deploy a truth-independent 'of'-locution in his discus-
sion of substance-ideas. But what point could there be to introducing
such a locution?
We first need to remind ourselves that considerations of better and
worse translation remain operative even in those cases ofLockean 'modes'
where we will readily agree that no normative consequences should be
drawn concerning either the translated utterances or the notions they
employ. Locke provides an excellent example:
[T]he Latin Names Hora, Pes, Libra, are, without difficulty, rendred by the English
names, Hour, Foot, and Pound: But yet there is nothing more evident, than that the
Ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin Names, were very far different from those
which an English-man expresses by those English ones. And if either of these should
nlake use of the measures that those of the other Language design'd by their Names,
he would be quite out in his account. (III.v.8: 433)
By pointing out that a Roman astronomer's notion ofan hour differs from
ours, we avoid the need to criticize him as 'out in his account.' While the
opponent of moral relativism may reject this approach in the case of
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many of Locke's 'mixed' modes such as justice, the example of 'Church'
(111.ix.9: 480) wililikely provoke the Lockean reaction. Granted, then, that
there can be a legitimate role for a normatively inert representational
locution, whywould Locke see fit to employ it in the case of natural kinds,
where whiggish assessment of the claims of our predecessors has
seemed so appealing? Locke relies on general idea-theoretic grounds
when he insists that the truth of his ordinary predications of the name
'gold' be determined by an object's possession of the collected qualities
he associates with that name, grounds deriving from the epistemic
conditions he places on how an idea can pick out the things that conform
to it.50 At the same time, though, his representational locutions are
designed to accommodate the very extemalistic pressures that lead his
opponents then and now to reject nominal-essence semantics. In particu-
lar, Locke does hold that ideas can be 'of' substances in a far stronger
sense than they can be 'of' modes. In the case of substantial sorts, we
have seen, 'ofness' is no longer normatively inert - its primary norma-
tive implications pertain not to the truth of assertions and beliefs involv-
ing substance-ideas but rather to what would count as appropriate
revision of our nominal essences. (Such considerations will even be
reflected in 'of'-ascriptions to those 'civil' users of substance-names who
only loosely and implicitly hold their classification accountable to na-
ture, as they will enter into our determination of how such speakers'
names are best to be 'rendered.')
Assuming I am a Lockean investigator, furthermore, which substance
my idea is an idea of will determine the truth of claims I can make using
semantic ascent (interpreted in the manner proposed). This makes avail-
able to Locke a legitimate secondary use of the substance-names themselves,
one that is straightforwardly parasitic on their 'ordinary signification'
(recall III.vi.19: 449, III.vi.43: 465). Provided the quality of fixedness is no
'part of the definition of thewordGold,' Locke interprets someone posing
the question whether gold is Jixed as asking whether 'all Gold, Le. all that
has the real Essence ofGold, is fixed' (1II.vi.50: 470, III.x.17: 499). Suppose
now that this person belongs to the enlightened class of 'Enquirers, (not
Disputers)' who have 'acknowledged themselves to have but imperfect
Ideas' of the species their inquiry concerns (III.xi.7: 511). Why not in turn
understand his question whether all that has the real essence of gold is
fixed as asking whether the substance Jor which he uses the name 'gold' is
50 SeeMartha Brandt Bolton, 'The Relevance of Locke's Theory of Ideas to his Doctrine
of Nominal Essence and Anti-Essentialist Semantic Theory' (1992), reprinted in
Locke, V. Chappell, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998),214-25.
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jixed?51 Gf course, a definitively affirmative answer could only be pro-
vided through (empirically guided) revision to the nominal essence. But
isn't this feature of a secondary use of substance-names precisely what
Locke has in mind when he describes the semantically self-conscious
'Enquirers' as to '[w ]hether a Bat be a Bird' as engaged in a 'real Enquiry,
concerning the Nature of a Bird, or a Bat,' where the goal of such inquiry
is 'to make their yet imperfect Ideas of it more complete' through empiri-
cal examination?
Admittedly, Locke can appear unwilling to sanction any use of sub-
stance-names on which their extensions are sorts characterized by real
essences. But his detailed critique of this 'abuse' (discussed in Section
11.2) arises in a context where the speaker is assumed to be oblivious to
Locke's own account of the mediating role of nominal essences, instead
falsely presupposing '[t]hat there are certain precise Essences, according
to which Nature makes all particular Things, and by which they are
distinguished into Species' (IILx.21: 502). By contrast, Locke would have
no reason to disallow the above-described secondary use of 'gold' as
referring to 'what has the real Essence oj Gold' (IILx.17: 499), one that no
longer rests on the 'secret Supposition' of an ultimately unintelligible
mode of responsiveness to real essences (IILx.18: 500). What he argues is
that any attempt to make one's word 'stand for' the real essence of gold,
of which we have no idea, willleave this word with 'no signification at
all' (IILx.19: 501; see also IILii.2: 405-6). But this complaint should not
apply to the secondary use of 'gold,' a use in which this word does stand
for an idea possessed by the speaker. While Locke has reason not to grant
us ideas of substantial forms - he confesses that he doesn't understand
what it is for something to be in this sense the real essen.ce of gold
(ILxxxi.6: 380, IILvi.10: 445) - he can't consistently deny that we possess
ideas of Lockean real essences, indirectly specified via nominal essences.
In the relevant sense, we do possess an idea of the real essence of gold
- how else could Locke refer to it?52
51 This identificationmay appear to fly in the face of Locke's contrast between the claim
that 'what has the real Essence ofGold is malleable' and the mere claim that 'what I call
Gold is malleable' (III.x.17: 499). The latter, however, is not intended by Locke as an
exploitation of semantic ascent. Parallel passages reveal it to be the claim that
malleableness 'is part of the Definition, part of the nominal Essence the Word Gold
stands for' (IILvi.50: 470, IV.viii.5: 612-3, IV.vi.9: 583).
52 Cf. Bolton, 'Substances, Substrata, and Names,' 509.
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V Conclusion
Aiming to exhibit a 'certain slackness' in Putnam's mechanism of natu-
ral-kind term reference, Keith Donnellan and Mark Wilson have inde-
pendently described a number of scenarios in which any determinate
attribution of a predicate's extension on the basis of a doctrine of natural
kinds would appear tantamount to an unwarranted prediction of the
future history of the community that uses it.53 On my reading of Locke
on substantial kinds, this line of criticism is remarkably reminiscent of
Locke's contention that the beholdenness of substance-nan1es' significa-
tions to natural standards involves 'some latitude' due to the availability
of multiple target kinds. (As we have seen, it isn't clear to what extent
he allows that this slackness may persist once we have departed 'civil'
discourse for the more regimented 'philosophical' discourse of natural
science. Recall also that the slackness he has in mind lies not in a term's
extension but only in the archetype to which it is 'referred.') Even Wil-
son's emphasis 011 contingencies surrounding a community's introduc-
tion to new phenomena calls to mind a scenario Locke uses to challenge
the semantic utility of a conception of species into which 'Things existing
are distinguished by Nature.' Reporting that water and ice are in fact
held to be 'two distinct Species of things,' he poses a rhetorical question:
But if an English-man, bred in Jamaiea, who, perhaps, had never seen nor heard of
lee, coming into England in the Winter, find, the Water he put in his Bason at night,
in a great part frozen in the morning; and not knowing any name it had, should caH
it harden'd Water; I ask, Whether this would be a new Species to him, different from
Water? And, I think, it would be answered here, Itwould not to himbe a new Speeies,
no more than congealed GeHy, when it is cold, is a distinct Species, from the same
GeHy fluid and warm.... (IILvi.13: 447-8)
Locke's polen1ical point, I take it, is that it would be absurd to look to a
theory of words' directedness at natural kinds in the hope of convicting
this individual of error when in th.ese circumstances he comes to regard
ice as the same kind of substance he has always called 'water.' Nothing
about his prior (no doubt 'confused') use of the word is likely to settle
that it should be regarded as any more directed at the natural kind liquid
water than at the equally natural kind water. Locke's response to an
objection that water in Jamaica and ice in England have different internal
constitutions would be his familiar query as to 'what difference in the
53 DonneHan, 'Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kinds,' in Knowledge and Mind, C. Ginet
and S. Shoemaker, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1983), 102;Wilson, 'Predi-
cate Meets Property,' Philosophieal Review 91 (1982) 549-89, passim.
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internal real Constitution makes a specifick difference' (III.vi.22: 451; see
also III.vi.39: 463).54 In much the same fashion, Wilson and Donnellan
argue that unless a predicate's extension is allowed to depend on con-
tingencies in its users' subsequent history (which they feel would be
intolerable55), Putnam-style theories of reference are liable to issue analo-
gously unwarranted error verdicts concerning whole language commu-
nities.
But while Locke thus prefigures recent critiques of the appeal to
natural kinds in semantics, he doesn't share the skepticism these cri-
tiques may reinforce about the very idea of a natural kind. Conceding to
the philosophers he criticizes that the practice of interpreting our ances-
tors as meaning by 'gold' and 'water' what we do now is itself unobjec-
tionable, Wilson warns that 'this selection should not be canonized into
a mythology of "natural kinds'" that are 'somehow prominent or privi-
leged in natLlre.,56 In his view, natural kind is an indefensible notion
dreamt up by philosophers in a misguided attempt at metaphysically
justifying the 'convenient' practice of anachronistic translation. This
accords quite closely with one of Locke's own hypotheses about the
origin of the Scholastic notion of species: it was invented in order to
'avoid' a situation inwhich 'Menmust suppose the sameword to signify
different Things in different Men,' a supposition it was recognized
'would very much cUITLber the use of Language' (III.vi.48-9: 469-70).
Nevertheless, I would like to conclude by suggesting that Locke's ac-
count of perfect ideas of substances gestures in the general direction of
a response to Wilson's skepticism.57 By looking to a nornl governing
54 Would Locke abjure criticism if the Jamaiean instead started calling iee 'glass'? Here
the response 'But iee and glass have different internal constitutions!' would have
greater bite: it isn't c1ear there exists a Lockean natural kind toward which the man's
word might be interpreted as pointing. Interestingly, Locke's example traces to the
early drafts, where he uses it to strikingly different effect: he illustrates people's
liability to 'mistake the meaneing of words by their unacquaintednesse with the
things themselves' by imagining a Jamaican who mistakenly calls frozen water
'glasse or chrystall or stone' (Locke,Drafts,Draft A, §2: 9, Draft B, §84: 192)! IfLocke's
positive aim in III.vi.13 were to explain that the proper assignment of meanings is
unconstrained by the natural kinds of things, there would have been no need to
change the example - in fact, the revised scenario would be highly tendentious.
55 Donnellan, 'Kripke and Putnam,' 103-4;Wilson, 'PredieateMeets Property,' 553. For
a bullet-biting defense of a 'diachronie division of linguistie labor,' cf. Hemy
Jackman, 'We Live Forwards but Understand Backwards: Linguistic Practiees and
Future Behavior,' Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999) 157-77.
56 Wilson, 'Predieate Meets Property,' 582, 578
57 Responses of a similar shape have not been uncommon in the philosophicallitera-
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scientific inquiry, Locke seeks to regain a metaphysically unproblematic
notion of natural kind, albeit one whose abundant exemplification ren-
ders it unavailable for the coreference-guaranteeing task he views as one
of the traditional notion's raisons d'etre.58
ture since Locke. One current proponent points to 'a line of thought that runs from
Kant through Peirce to recent writers such as Sellars and Putnam' (Philip Kitcher,
The Advancement ofScience: Science without Legends, Objectivity without Illusions (New
York: Oxford University Press 1993), 171-3).
58 I have profited from discussions with and comments by Joseph L. Camp and
Elizabeth L. Jockusch, as well as from suggestions by anonymous referees. An
ancestor of this paper was written while I was supported under aNational Science
Foundation Graduate Fellowship.
